SPF

Implementing SPF Fail policy using Exchange Online rule (dealing with Spoof E-mail attack) | Phase 2 production | part 3#3 5/5 (5)

Post Views: 10,369 The current article is the last article in the article series, in which we review how to implement SPF Fail policy using Exchange Online rule. In the present article, we will discuss how to apply the second phase of our project, in which, when the Exchange rule identifies an event of “SPF…

Implementing SPF Fail policy using Exchange Online rule (dealing with Spoof E-mail attack) | Phase 1 – learning mode | Part 2#3 5/5 (9)

Post Views: 10,363 In the current article, we will review how to implement an SPF Policy for incoming mail by using an Exchange rule. In our scenario, we want to identify an event, in which hostile element tries to execute a Spoof mail attack by presenting himself, as a legitimate recipient who uses an E-mail…

Using sender verification for identifying Spoof mail | SPF, DKIM, DMARC, Exchange and Exchange Online |Part 8#9 5/5 (2)

Post Views: 9,195 Spoof mail attack is implemented by a hostile element the try to spoof sender identity. The way for dealing with a Spoof mail attack is, by applying a procedure, which check and verify the sender identity (check if the sender considers as a legitimate sender of a spoofed sender). Using SPF, DKIM…

How does sender verification work? (How we identify Spoof mail) | The five hero’s SPF, DKIM DMARC, Exchange and Exchange Online protection | Part 9#9 5/5 (4)

Post Views: 10,769 The process of “sender verification”, enables us to distinguish between a legitimate sender versus an attacker who spoofs his identity and prevent a possible Spoof mail attack. In the current article, we will review in details three sender verification standard – SPF, DKIM, DMARC and also two sender verification methods that can…

How to simulate Spoof E-mail attack and bypass SPF sender verification? | 2#2 5/5 (14)

Post Views: 25,467 In the current article, we will demonstrate how to simulate Spoof E-mail attack, that will bypass existing SPF sender verification implementation. The current article series include two articles. The former article is – How can hostile element execute Spoof E-mail attack and bypass existing SPF implementation? | introduction | 1#2 Disclaimer For…

How can hostile element execute Spoof E-mail attack and bypass existing SPF implementation? | introduction | 1#2 5/5 (5)

Post Views: 6,960 In the current article series, we will learn about a structured vulnerability of the SPF mail standard, which can be easily exploited by a hostile element. The hostile element that is aware of this SPF vulnerability, can bypass the existing “SPF wall” that was built for protecting our organization recipients from Spoofing…